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 Gerrymandering Revisited—Searching for a Standard 
 
Theodore R. Boehm* 
 
I. DISTRICTING IN A NUTSHELL 
 
History is replete with examples of legislative districts created to assure the 
election or defeat of specific candidates or to preserve the domination of a majority 
party. By the time John Kennedy sought the Presidency in 1960, perpetuation of 
incumbent interests had taken the form of inaction as well as affirmative jiggering of 
district lines. Many states had not redistricted for decades despite massive shifts in 
concentrations of population, generally from small towns and rural areas to cities and 
their suburbs. In the most egregious example of malapportionment, Dallas’ 
Congressional district cast five times the votes of smallest Texas district.1 The 1960 
election in Indiana was conducted using maps that had been created in 1921. Only 
half as many people voted in the largely rural Ninth District as did in Marion County, 
which included the pre-UniGov city of Indianapolis and was a single congressional 
district.2 
Until the 1960s, the federal courts had heeded Justice Frankfurter’s caution 
against venturing into the “political thicket” and declared these practices, however 
objectionable, beyond judicial scrutiny.3 But in 1962 the Supreme Court opened the 
courthouse door to constitutional challenges to congressional districts.4 A nationwide 
frenzy of districting litigation ensued. Within two years, Wesberry v. Sanders5 
imposed rough equivalence of district population in congressional races, and Reynolds 
v. Sims6 did the same for elections of both houses of state legislatures. 
Equal population requirements proved to impose no restraint on the ability of 
legislators to keep a heavy thumb on the scale in their own elections. Manipulation 
of legislative districts for the benefit of a favored party or individual candidate is 
nothing new. But modern technology has substantially facilitated a temporary 
majority’s ability to perpetuate its dominance of a legislative body. This art has now 
advanced to the point that the legislators in dozens of states can join the North 
Carolina state senator who famously observed in 1998: “We are in the business of 
rigging elections.”7 
 
 
* Partner, Hoover Hull Turner LLP, Indianapolis, IN. Mr. Boehm is a former Justice of the Indiana 
Supreme Court and was the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in Davis v. Bandemer, discussed infra. 
1 Benjamin J. Gunthrie, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, Statistics of the Presidential and 
Congressional Election of November 8, 1960 44 (1961), http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electioninfo 
/1960election.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
4 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
5 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
6 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
7 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting a North Carolina state 
senator). 
60 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [5:1 
 
 
 
Chief Justice Earl Warren considered the redistricting cases the most 
important of his time leading the Supreme Court because the effects of reshaped 
federal and state legislatures reverberated across every aspect of American life.8 We 
are potentially on the cusp of an equally significant ruling that gerrymanders violate 
the Federal Constitution. 
II. GERRYMANDERS: A PROBLEM WITH MANY DIMENSIONS 
 
There are many reasons to adjust district lines to achieve some electoral result. 
For purposes of this discussion, a gerrymander is an attempt to assure a political 
party’s domination of a legislative chamber by creating as many districts as possible 
that are likely or certainly safe for the party. This means creating a majority of 
districts at least fifty-five percent favorable to the party and concentrating or 
“packing” the opposition’s voters into a minority of districts.9 
 
Voter confusion. Complaints about gerrymandering, including those from some 
courts, take a variety of forms. Early attacks, including the Boston Globe’s, which 
coined the term “Gerry-mander” in 1812, focus on “traditional” districting principles 
that essentially turn on the appearance of the district on the map.10 Even today, 
Justice John Paul Stevens advocates a federal constitutional amendment to constrain 
mapmakers by requiring districts to be compact and contiguous and to justify any 
deviation by adherence to existing political boundaries, such as county and municipal 
borders.11 There is merit in requiring district lines to follow boundaries that define 
units of municipal government. Districts that follow no pattern and have irregular 
shapes conforming to no widely understood demarcations are confusing and make it 
difficult for voters to identify their representative. But with today’s very sophisticated 
software and the ability to manipulate precinct level voting data, the constraints of 
compactness, contiguity, and adherence to other boundaries are not sufficient to 
prevent an effective gerrymander. And voter confusion is only one of the many 
reasons why gerrymanders are undesirable. 
Conflict of interest. A more fundamental problem with a gerrymander is that 
it is a law passed by vote of the majority party and opposed by the minority members. 
Virtually all of the approving legislators have a blatant conflict of interest. Of course, 
many laws are voted upon by legislators with some self-interest at stake, and 
legislators are generally free to vote for legislation that may benefit them 
individually—for example, by favoring an industry in which they have an interest. 
Particularly in states with part-time legislatures, this practice is considered the 
necessary cost of a democratic form of government. In the case of most legislation, the 
judgment of disinterested legislators is considered a sufficient restraint on abuse of 
 
 
8 Ed Cray, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 437 (1997). 
9 See infra note 35. 
10 See Christopher Klein, ‘A New Species of Monster’, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 10, 2011), https://www.bostonglobe. 
com/ideas/2011/09/10/new-species-monster/TRpFHqNSEeLV2OGlUi1HyI/ story.html. 
11 See JOHN  PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND  WHY WE SHOULD  CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 
HARDCOVER (2014). 
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principle. But a gerrymander is qualitatively different from most other legislation. 
The majority-party legislators who support a gerrymander are precisely the favored 
few the law benefits. By perpetuating their majority party domination, it assures 
many of the majority a shot at a committee chair, and gives most of them a friendly 
district for reelection. In that respect, those few citizens, and only they, are the direct 
beneficiaries of the law they are imposing on all others. 
 
Unrepresentative legislative bodies. A third obvious issue raised by a 
gerrymander is it unfairly skews election results as between the parties. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly found no constitutional right to proportional 
representation—that is, elected representatives need not be in proportion to the votes 
cast for their respective candidates across the state.12 But a map that purposely packs 
voters of one party into a minority of districts is as pernicious in effect as patently 
unlawful practices such as intimidation of minority party voters at the polls or 
creating districts of substantially unequal population. In that sense a gerrymander 
is unfair to the minority party. But apart from any unfairness to a political group, a 
gerrymander produces a legislature that is not representative of the general voter 
population. Successful candidates in primary elections are predominantly those who 
appeal to their party’s most enthusiastic supporters who tend to positions many 
regard as extreme. The general election in most districts of a gerrymandered map 
merely ratifies the election of the winners of the majority party primary, resulting in 
a legislature that underrepresents the views of moderates and centrists. 
 
Polarized legislative bodies. Fourth, a gerrymander produces a legislature 
composed of mostly safe districts for one party or the other. In those districts the 
primary election becomes the only significant event, and the successful candidate is 
one who runs to the center of his party’s voters. The result is a legislature with few 
centrists and with few who need to appeal to a broad range of constituents. Many 
argue that this in turn contributes to polarization and gridlock.13 Regardless of the 
validity of that charge, at a minimum the legislature does not reflect the attitudes of 
the electorate as a whole by, in effect, underrepresenting the vast political center. 
 
Disenfranchised Independents and minority party adherents. Fifth, 
gerrymanders in many states, including Indiana, effectively disenfranchise 
Independents and third party candidates in most districts. By creating large numbers 
of districts as nearly impregnable fortresses of one of the two major parties, a 
gerrymander reduces the general election to a pro forma ratification of the primary. 
The result is that Independents and third party adherents in those safe districts have 
no meaningful role in the selection of the legislature. The extent of that consequence 
may depend on state laws and to some extent the voting practices of the state. Some 
 
 
12 See e.g. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; see also ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET. AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA (2004). 
13 For a discussion of this debate, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011); But see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. 
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009). 
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states have “open” primaries and experience significant crossover voting in the 
primary elections. Others, including Indiana, have some deterrent to adherents of a 
different party, or even genuinely undecided voters, participating in a party’s primary 
election.14 Even if there is no consequence to voting other than as permitted by 
statute, a voter’s choice of party in the primary is a matter of public record, and that 
alone undoubtedly deters many who do not want to appear to affiliate with a party 
that is not of their choice. The constitutional right of free association includes the 
right not to associate, and those who do not wish to identify themselves as Republican 
or Democrat have a right to do that. 
Voter alienation. Sixth, gerrymanders discourage all voters from participation 
in the election. The extent to which gerrymanders contribute to voter apathy and 
distrust of government is for others to analyze. But the contribution of gerrymanders 
to the health of the body politic can’t be positive. Because the result in the general 
election is preordained by each district’s majority party primary, supporters of the 
district’s minority party have less incentive to bother to vote, and less interest in the 
strengths and weaknesses of the candidates. Gerrymanders produce a number of 
uncontested legislative races across the state. Reduced voter turnout is less felt in 
presidential years but nonetheless significant. To compound this problem, the 
spectacle of legislators choosing their voters rather than voters choosing their 
representatives only fosters cynical disrespect for the process. 
In sum, a gerrymander produces a number of destructive and anti-democratic 
consequences, but it serves only the private interests of the dominant political party 
and, more specifically, its legislators. 
III. GERRYMANDERS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
In a few states voters have taken these problems in their own hands and 
wrested the process from the legislature’s grasp, enacting a bipartisan approach to 
districting by direct voter initiative. But in the many states without voter initiatives 
and in those whose state constitution expressly vests districting power in the 
legislature, there is little evidence that the state legislatures will adopt any 
meaningful reform of state legislative districts. And because the state legislatures 
draw the Congressional maps, without reform of the state process, we can expect 
minimal progress in Congressional districting.15 When control of the General 
Assembly was divided, the two parties confirmed skepticism of legislative relief as to 
Indiana’s state maps. The majority in each house drew a map to its liking for itself 
 
 
14 In Indiana, any voter in the precinct may challenge an attempt to vote in a party’s primary. IND. CODE 
ANN. § 3-10-1-6 (LexisNexis 2011) provides that a voter is “eligible” to vote in the primary if the voter 
voted in the last general for a majority of the party’s candidates, or did not vote in the last general, but 
intends to vote for a majority of that party’s candidates in the upcoming general election. How this works 
in practice is not clear, and may vary across the state. In fact it seems clear that in some recent elections 
there was some crossover voting without any consequence to the voters who crossed party lines. 
15 Indiana has a form of bipartisan districting for congressional elections if the legislature fails to agree on 
congressional districts. This was put in place in 1988 when the two major parties each controlled one 
house of the state legislature and a deadlock in passage of a congressional map was foreseeable. It has 
never been used. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (LexisNexis 2011). 
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and approved the other house’s self-drawn plan. The result was a decade-long 
bipartisan gerrymander favoring Democrats in the House and Republicans in the 
Senate. 
As explained in Part II, federal constitutional precedent offers some hope of 
judicial cabining of gerrymanders. And state legislatures create both their own and 
congressional maps, but they more directly labor under a conflict of interest in 
drawing their own districts. The odds seem good that reform of state legislatures will 
lead to fair congressional districting. All of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that 
a federal constitutional challenge to gerrymandering of state legislatures offers the 
most likely prospect of assuring that we have functioning state and federal legislative 
branches that are broadly representative of the electorate and not only the zealous 
adherents of the two major parties. 
Redistricting cases are heard by three-judge courts and appeals go directly to 
the Supreme Court. Beginning in the 1980s and recurring sporadically since, 
challenges to the constitutionality of gerrymandering have been raised, but as of this 
writing none have been ultimately successful.16 Few would dispute the importance 
of the questions whether a court can strike down a legislative map that meets the 
population equality test and does not violate the Voting Rights Act, as well as what 
a successful plaintiff must show to achieve that result. Some likely critical issues, 
notably partisan intent to disadvantage a voting group, are essentially factual, so a 
successful trial court ruling will be a leg up; but the courts have yet to establish an 
attainable legal standard a plaintiff must meet. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that 
any attempt to analyze the prospects of a successful challenge must start and end 
with the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
Davis v. Bandemer (1986)17 The first pure gerrymandering case to reach the 
Supreme Court came from Indiana. In Davis v. Bandemer, the three-judge trial court, 
by 2-1 decision, had agreed with the plaintiffs that the redistricting plan enacted after 
the 1980 census violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The plaintiffs were Democratic voters from several parts of the state who 
claimed that the map was a law that was intended to, and did, disadvantage an 
identifiable  group,  in  this  case  Democrats,  and  was  justified  by  no  legitimate 
governmental interest. Plaintiffs presented this claim as grounded in established 
Equal  Protection  doctrine,  including  principles  that  “the  state  must  govern 
impartially”18 and legislative classifications must be “rational” (that is, must “serve 
important governmental purposes”).19  They bolstered their claim with language from 
several Supreme Court cases affirming that laws having “a real and appreciable 
impact  on  the  exercise  of  the  franchise”  must  “serve  important  governmental 
objectives.” 20 Plaintiffs also argued that the law was intentionally designed to injure 
 
 
16 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 831, 839–49 (2015). 
17 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
18 N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). 
19 Id. 
20 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
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supporters of a political party, which is a group of citizens entitled to be free from 
discriminatory legislation.21 
The defendants responded that the issue was not justiciable because there 
were no judicially manageable standards, redistricting was inherently a political 
issue, and the Equal Protection Clause conferred no group right on political parties 
or their supporters. Because at that time the nationwide effect of curtailing 
gerrymandering would have benefited Republicans more than Democrats, an unusual 
array of amici curiae appeared. Briefs supporting the plaintiffs were filed by the 
ACLU, Common Cause, and The Republican National Committee. The California 
State Assembly, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and 
the California Democratic Congressional Delegation supported the defendants. 
The Supreme Court reversed by a seven-two vote with no majority opinion. A 
four-justice plurality (White, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun) held the 
plaintiff’s claims justiciable. The plurality quoted at length from Baker v. Carr, which 
opened the door to challenges to unequal populations and limited nonjusticiable 
“political questions” to six areas described collectively as those “essentially a function 
of separation of powers.”22 Among these are matters lacking “judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards.”23 The plurality agreed that there was no “arithmetic 
presumption” to identify a constitutional violation, but rejected the claim that this 
established a lack of judicially manageable standards.24 The plurality noted that 
when Baker held challenges to unequal population justiciable, the “one-person-one- 
vote”25 rule had not yet been devised. 
Turning to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, the plurality noted that in 
multimember districting cases the Court had “repeatedly stated that districting that 
would ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political 
elements of the voting population’ would raise a constitutional question.”26 The 
plurality agreed with the district court that plaintiffs were required to prove both 
intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual 
discriminatory effect on that group. The plurality readily accepted the district court’s 
finding of intentional discrimination. The maps had been designed in secret with the 
aid of computer consultants and were moved through the legislative process through 
 
 
 
21 E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 327, 363 (1976). 
22  Davis, 478 U.S.at 121 ("It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the 
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more 
elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface 
of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”) (quoting 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). 
23 Id. at 217. 
24 Id. at 110. 
25 Id. at 150. 
26 Id. at 119 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)) (emphasis removed). 
2016] Gerrymandering Revisited 65 
 
 
 
“vehicle” bills which had no content. The maps were first revealed to the minority 
members or the public in the last days of the legislative session. The final approval 
was by unanimous Republican majorities in both houses of the Indiana General 
Assembly over the dissenting votes of all Democratic members. 
Despite the partisan motivation, the plurality found the proof of lasting effect 
insufficient.27 The plurality would require proof “that the challenged legislative plan 
has had or will have effects that are sufficiently serious to require intervention by the 
federal courts in state reapportionment decisions.”28 The trial of the case was held in 
1984 before the election of that year.29 The only evidence of the effect of the maps was 
the 1982 election, in which Democratic candidates received 51.9% of the votes cast 
for the Indiana House but elected only 43 of 100 Representatives.30 The plurality held 
that one election was not sufficient to establish a lasting injury. 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and future Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, would reverse for lack of justiciability.31 Justice O’Connor also found no 
right of a political group to assert a constitutional claim.32 In her view, the racial 
discrimination cases were not applicable precedent because court intervention to 
address racial discrimination was justified by the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
Justice O’Connor supported her conclusions with two factual assertions that 
time has proved questionable. First, gerrymandering has not proven to be “self- 
limiting,” as she suggested based on an academic study published in 1984.34 To the 
contrary, it has metastasized. To use the Indiana example again, the 1981 map 
challenged in Bandemer created fifty-six House districts that were considered by its 
sponsoring legislators to be “safe” for Republicans, and the election results bore out 
their confidence.35 The 2011 Indiana gerrymander produced at most five competitive 
Senate districts and perhaps ten competitive House districts in the Indiana state 
maps. Thirty-seven Indiana House races were uncontested in the 2014 general 
election. Congressional districts across the nation show the same trend. Few studies 
conclude that more than 35 of the 435 districts today are competitive. 
Second, Justice O’Connor found no proof “that political gerrymandering is an 
evil that cannot be checked or cured by the people or by the parties themselves.”36 As 
already noted, in a few states, including Justice O’Connor’s Arizona, a voter initiative 
has been invoked by “the people” to address gerrymandering. But in a large majority 
 
 
 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 134. 
29 Id. at 163. 
30 Id. at 181–182. 
31 Id. at 144. 
32 Id. at 144–61. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 152. 
35        The district court found a district “competitive” if neither major party had more than 55% of the votes for 
the two major party candidates. This standard of measuring “safe” and “competitive” districts was 
accepted by the district court and endorsed by experts for both sides. As will be elaborated below, it has 
stood the test of time. If one party has 55% of the vote, the other party must increase its 45% by 10% of 
the two-party total, or 11.1% of its votes. History has shown this occurs rarely, hence a district with one 
party whose candidate received 55% or greater in the district is considered “safe” for that party. Id. 
36 Id. at 152. 
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of states a voter initiative is not available, and, as described in Part I, temporary 
legislative majorities across the nation have typically sought to solidify a stranglehold 
on the maps. 
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented.37 They would accept 
Justice Fortas’ definition of gerrymandering as “deliberate and arbitrary distortion 
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes” and 
would affirm the district court’s judgment.38 They pointed out that some district lines 
may be distorted to achieve a partisan advantage, but the effect is statewide. The 
dissent would look to several factors in evaluating whether there was deliberate 
manipulation of districts without legitimate justification. These factors include 
whether the legislative process itself exhibited partisan motivation (which the 
plurality also found), disregard of traditional political boundaries, irregular shaped 
districts, and the absence of any considerations beyond partisan advantage. 
 
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) Following the redistricting to adjust for the 2000 
census, plaintiffs tried again, this time in Pennsylvania. Vieth v. Jubelirer39 was 
appealed to the Supreme Court after the three-judge court dismissed plaintiffs’ 
political gerrymandering claim. Again, the Supreme Court produced no majority 
opinion. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and 
Thomas, argued that the Bandemer holding of justiciability should be revisited and 
overruled. The plurality first noted that Article 1, §4 of the Constitution allows 
Congress to “make or alter” Congressional districts as drawn by states; and in 1842, 
Congress had acted to require single member districts of “contiguous territory”40; and 
in 1872, Congress had imposed a requirement of equal population.41 Since 1911, only 
the single member district requirement survives. 
The plurality then turned to the language from Baker v. Carr to describe 
nonjusticiable “political questions” and quoted verbatim in Bandemer. The plurality 
labeled them “six independent tests” of nonjusticiability and focused on the second: 
“a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” which imposes the 
requirement that, unlike legislatures, courts are to impose law only if “principled, 
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”42 The plurality noted that although 
lower courts had entertained claims of unconstitutional gerrymandering, none had 
granted relief, and no plaintiff had satisfied the Bandemer plurality’s standard.43 The 
Vieth plurality described the Bandemer standard in various ways, both as to 
individual districts and as to the state as a whole. But the plurality did not describe 
it, as it might fairly be summarized, as a requirement of a showing of a lasting 
impairment of voting strength. Rather, the plurality attacks the Bandemer approach 
 
 
 
37 Id. at 161. 
38 Id. at 164. 
39 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267. 
40 5 Stat. 491 (1842). 
41 12 Stat 572 (1872). 
42 Vieth, 541 U.S.at 277–78. 
43 Id. at 279–80. 
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as confused because the plurality saw no clear way to identify the predominant 
purpose as between the likely ever-present partisan considerations and other 
considerations such as compactness, adherence to political boundaries, etc.44 But this 
is a fact question, as later cases will hold, and the evidence in virtually every 
gerrymandering case demonstrates to any objective observer that the predominant 
motivation for the maps as a whole was preservation of the dominant party’s majority 
status. Indeed, all six Justices of the Bandemer court who addressed the question 
found it obvious. 
The Vieth plaintiffs argued for a standard that would require proof of (1) 
systematic “cracking and packing” the minority and (2) inability of the minority to 
attain a majority of the seats even if it obtained a majority of the votes.45 The 
plurality viewed this as a claim that groups have a right to proportional 
representation, a right that several precedents have rejected.46 The plurality 
understood the plaintiffs’ measure of the minority party’s vote to be based  on 
statewide races and responded that this measure was unworkable because candidates 
of both major parties had won statewide races. The plurality also accepted the view 
that “there is no statewide vote” for districted legislative offices, citing two relatively 
dated academic sources.47 Finally, the plurality noted that “natural” packing occurs 
from the fact that some groups, notably Democrats in cities, are more densely 
clustered, and therefore a neutrally drawn map would be biased against them. 
Justice Stevens agreed that statewide claims are nonjusticiable, but individual 
district claims were cognizable by analogy to racial gerrymanders, which had been 
held unconstitutional.48 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, found the Bandemer standard too 
demanding and would later find some gerrymanders unconstitutional, but he would 
limit the plaintiffs to district-specific claims. Souter would allow a claim based on a 
burden-shifting process patterned on those used in employment and housing 
discrimination cases. If a plaintiff’s district were manipulated to the disadvantage of 
the plaintiff’s group, the defendants would be required to justify the district by 
objectives other than naked partisan advantage. 
Justice Breyer dissented, viewing the partisan gerrymandering as “unjustified 
entrenchment,” and he set out several scenarios that he considered sufficient to 
support a claim. As might be expected, all of this came down to Justice Kennedy, 
whose views on this matter will likely be dispositive, absent a change in the Court. 
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the plaintiffs had not set out a 
“manageable and workable standard” to evaluate political gerrymanders, but he was 
not willing to conclude that none could be found. He therefore formed a majority to 
 
 
 
44 Id. at 284. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 268. 
47        Id. at 289 (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in 
the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1985); see also PETER SCHUCK, 
Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial Solution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 
AND THE COURTS 240, 241 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). 
48 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630 (1993). 
68 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [5:1 
 
 
 
affirm dismissal of the Vieth complaint, but left for future resolution whether a 
majority of the Court could find a manageable standard. Interestingly, Justice 
Kennedy introduced the concept that the First Amendment, whose right of 
association protects the formation of political parties, also protects “representational 
rights.” And he suggested that if a gerrymander “had the purpose and effect of 
imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters, the First Amendment may 
offer a sounder and more prudential basis for intervention than does the Equal 
Protection Clause.”49 In his view, the  ultimate constitutional issue is whether 
political considerations “burden representational rights,”50 and a manageable 
standard requires a means to “measure the effect of the apportionment . . . to conclude 
that the State did impose a burden.”51 
 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)52  dealt with the 
Texas legislature’s redrawing of Congressional districts in mid-decade to override a 
plan devised by a court after the initial apportionment was found to violate the 
population requirement. The plaintiffs alleged both Voting Rights Act violations and 
unconstitutional political gerrymandering. Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-justice 
majority, putting to rest the tenuous claim advanced by a few courts53 that Vieth had 
held gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. Describing his own deciding vote, Justice 
Kennedy stated: “The Vieth plurality would have held such challenges nonjusticiable 
political questions, but a majority declined to do so.”54 In a portion of his opinion, 
writing for himself, Justice Kennedy succinctly described a  successful partisan 
gerrymandering claim as one that imposes “a burden, as measured by a reliable 
standard, on the complainants’ representational rights.”55 
A majority found the new legislative plan violated the Voting Rights Act by 
splitting a Latino majority district. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both 
addressing redistricting cases for the first time, affirmed dismissal of the 
gerrymandering claim for failure to offer a reliable standard but expressed no opinion 
on justiciability. Justices Scalia and Thomas adhered to their view that the 
gerrymandering claim was nonjusticiable. 
Some observers took LULAC as indicating the Court’s receptivity to revisiting 
Vieth and Bandemer,56 but until recently, few plaintiffs have taken up the 
challenge.57 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315. 
50 Id. at 269. 
51 Id. at 315. 
52 See League of United Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
53 Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843, 855 (Ct. 
App. 2005); see Benisek v. Mack, 11 F.Supp.3d 516, 524–25 (D. Md. 2014). 
54 Perry, 548 U.S. at 400. 
55 Id. at 404. 
56 Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan 
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007). 
57 Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 16 at 832. 
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IV. TEA LEAVES IN SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
 
The Supreme Court has not entertained a direct constitutional challenge to a 
gerrymander since LULAC. But the Court has addressed several cases on the 
periphery of that issue that may offer insight into the Justices’ current thinking. 
By the time Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission58 reached the Court in 2015, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor had 
replaced Justices Souter and Stevens. All indications are that this had no effect on 
the 4-4 division that gave Justice Kennedy the deciding vote in Veith and LULAC. 
Arizona, like California and some other western states, allows voters to enact 
laws by popular vote, and Arizona voters had used that process to transfer the 
districting function from the state legislature to a bipartisan commission. The 
Arizona Legislature sued to preserve its districting prerogative, claiming that the 
Elections Clause of the Federal Constitution required that districts be drawn by the 
state legislature. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor 
and Kagan, held that if a state chooses to vest legislative power in the people as a 
whole, it does not violate the Elections Clause.59 Ginsburg’s opinion for this five- 
justice majority quoted from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Veith: “‘Partisan 
gerrymanders,’ this Court has recognized ‘are incompatible with democratic 
principles.’”60 She summarized the state of play on partisan gerrymandering: “The 
plurality [in Veith] held the matter nonjusticiable. Justice Kennedy found no 
standard workable in that case, but “left open the possibility that a suitable standard 
might be identified in later litigation.”61 Like LULAC, this language, not necessary 
to resolve the Elections Clause issue, can be read as an open invitation to reopen the 
search for a suitable standard. 
Finally, shortly after the death of Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer writing for a 
unanimous Court, decided Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.62 In that case, Arizona legislators and their allies renewed their attempt 
to regain the keys to the legislative fortress, this time contending that the bipartisan 
commission had drawn its map to favor Democrats, and therefore the population 
variations in the state legislative maps, though within tolerances acceptable if 
justified by legitimate redistricting principles, were based on illegitimate 
considerations and were unconstitutional. 
The Court unanimously rejected the factual premise that the commission had 
been motivated by partisan considerations, accepting the district court’s factual 
finding that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was the reason for the 
commission’s accepting population deviations within the ten percent tolerance 
allowed by precedent. The unanimous opinion concluded by “assuming, without 
 
 
 
 
58 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2652 (2015). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 2658 (citing Veith, 541 U.S. at 316). 
61 Id. (citing Veith, 541 U.S. at 281, 317). 
62 993 F.Supp.2d 1042 (D.Ariz. 2014). 
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deciding, that partisanship is an illegitimate redistricting factor,” plaintiffs failed to 
show it. 
 
V. SEARCHING FOR STANDARDS 
 
Gerrymanderers typically do their work as soon as a new census is available 
and create hypothetical models based on past elections. Essentially the same 
techniques adopted by the Indiana Republican majority and its highly paid 
consultants in 1981 are in use today, though refined and improved by vastly greater 
computing power and the ease with which graphic displays of districts can be easily 
manipulated to test a tweak here or there to a given district. Repeated use and 
refinement of this technique at considerable expense demonstrates it is believed 
reliable and effective. The results in most states are maps with all the attendant 
problems identified in Part I. The need for judicial intervention cannot be overstated. 
Voter initiatives are not available in most states, and the legislative branch, 
inherently locked in a conflict of interest of monumental proportions, has shown itself 
incapable of reform in almost every state. 
A majority of the current Court is now on board with Justice Kennedy’s 
summary of the situation: gerrymandering claims are justiciable, but no manageable 
standard to measure the burden on representative rights has yet been shown. 
Gerrymandering is thus now in the same place districts of unequal populations were 
after Baker and before Wesberry and Reynolds. Plaintiffs are now launching a new 
round of constitutional challenges attempting to establish such a standard, and some 
may reach the Supreme Court in the next term. 
 
The Efficiency Gap as a Measureable Standard. Whitford v. Nichol63 was tried 
in May 2016, and is before the three-judge court for decision as of this writing. The 
court had previously denied defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint and for 
summary judgment, carefully reserving for trial whether the plaintiffs’ proof would 
be sufficient to establish a claim. The Whitford plaintiffs alleged an unconstitutional 
gerrymander of the Wisconsin state House and Senate.64 They proceeded on the 
assumption that such a claim required proof of partisan motivation and a 
measurable, material, and lasting effect on the voting power of the minority party. 
Partisan motivation relied in part on evidence developed in a prior case which 
had attacked the same maps based on population deviations of less than one 
percent.65 The plaintiffs there contended that even these usually permissible 
deviations were unconstitutional because the map was drawn with partisan intent. 
The three-judge court in that prior case described the denials of partisan intent from 
the legislative staffers involved, some of whom also testified in Whitford, as “almost 
laughable,”66 but dismissed the complaint because the population deviations were de 
minimis. 
 
 
63 No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47048 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 7, 2016). 
64 Id. at 918. 
65 Baldus v. Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Wis. 2012). 
66 Id. at 851. 
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The Whitford plaintiffs presented evidence of the legislative process similar to 
that found sufficient by six justices in Bandemer—secrecy in developing the maps, 
rushed legislative process driven by party-line voting, outside consultants testing 
various maps for partisan bias based on prior election returns, and statements of the 
drafters or their consultants.67 They offered the “efficiency gap” proposed by 
Stephanopoulos and McGee68 as a measure of partisan effect to meet a manageable 
legal standard. The efficiency gap measures the difference in the number of “wasted 
votes” for candidates of the two major parties. Wasted votes are votes cast for a losing 
candidate, plus all votes for a winner above the number required to win the district. 
The efficiency gap is the difference between the statewide totals of wasted votes for 
the two parties expressed as a percentage (positive or negative) of the total votes for 
the two parties’ candidates for the legislative body. Here is a simple example of the 
efficiency gap in a hypothetical election of a nine-district legislative body with 900 
voters, 450 of each party. Its map looks like this, with the most recent party votes in 
each district: 
 
55-45 Red 55-45 Red 55-45 Red 
60-40 Blue 60-40 Blue 60-40 Blue 
55-45 Red 55-45 Red 55-45 Red 
 
In this example six districts would be considered “safe” for Red and three “safe” 
for Blue. The efficiency gap is 16.7%, calculated as follows (for simplicity ignoring the 
one vote more than 50%, which is immaterial in the real world where districts contain 
thousands of voters):69 
3 40 60 120 180 120 9 3x40=120 3x10=30 
 Total votes: 450 450 Total wasted votes: 150 300 
         
Efficiency Gap= (300-150)/900=150/900= +16.67% in favor of Red   
    -16.67% disadvantage to Blue   
         
         
         
 
 
67 Whitford, 151 F.Supp.3d at 918; Davis, 478 U.S. at 109. 
68 Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 16 (The article was widely circulated among academics and 
advocates concerned with redistricting issues for some time before its publication). 
69 See id. at 18 (In the real world, districts are not exactly equal in number of votes cast, so adding the 
wasted votes by district is tedious. A simpler and quicker method of calculating the efficiency gap in a 
two party race is ½ of a party’s seat advantage minus 2 times its vote advantage, with both advantages 
expressed as percentages. In this hypothetical Red captured 6/9 or 66.7% of the seats, which is 33.3% 
more than Blue’s 33.3%. The two parties each received 450 votes, so Red’s vote advantage is 0%. The 
efficiency gap is ½ of 33.3% or 16.7%). 
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In simple terms, the efficiency gap is an index of the relative legislative muscle 
the two parties get from each vote and how much the districting dilutes the vote of 
one party. It measures the presence in a map of the goal that a gerrymanderer sets 
out to accomplish: “pack” as many of the opposing party’s voters as possible into 
districts that the opponents will win anyway, and “crack” the opponent’s votes in 
competitive districts down to levels that assure success for the gerrymanderer. 
The efficiency gap thus supplies the “measurable” component of a manageable 
standard of unconstitutional gerrymandering, analogous to the equal population 
requirements of Wesberry and Reynolds. It also is relevant, but not sufficient, to 
establish partisan motivation. 
 
Proof of a material and lasting burden. The challenge raised by the Bandemer 
plurality and by the Court’s later demands for a manageable standard is to establish 
that the maps will create a lasting and material impairment of the minority party’s 
representational rights. These requirements boil down to showing how much of an 
efficiency gap revealed by the first actual election under a new map (or  by a 
hypothetical election using the new districts measured by the voting history from past 
election) is sufficient to demonstrate a probable, lasting material impairment of 
representational rights. 
To establish reliability and durability, the Whitford plaintiffs did not rely 
solely on common sense or the fact that the defendants spent over $200,000 to 
generate their maps.70 Plaintiffs offered two basic means of testing the durability of 
an efficiency gap of a given magnitude. One expert testified that he had analyzed a 
large number of elections and found that a map exhibiting an efficiency gap of seven 
percent or more in the most recent election would continue the dominant party as the 
majority in the legislative chamber throughout a decade in 95% of the cases. The 
plaintiffs argue that this finding and other statistical showings establish to a high 
degree of probability that the degree of Republican bias in the Wisconsin map will 
enable it to retain majority control throughout the decade, thus establishing a 
material and lasting impairment of the minority party voters’ representational 
rights. 
Mopping up. There are a number of subsidiary issues that are often debated 
and cloud the issue. It is true that in some areas, notably cities with large minority 
populations, Democrats tend to be clustered more densely than Republicans.71 The 
degree to which that is truer of Democrats (in cities) than Republicans (in suburbs) 
is hotly debated. Very likely, however, any “natural” bias rarely exceeds low single 
digits, and never approaches the thirteen percent efficiency gap that the Whitford 
plaintiffs allege. Similarly, there is some skirmishing over how to account for the 
efficiency gap in uncontested districts, which are numerous in some heavily 
gerrymandered states. Some hypothetical vote for the nonexistent opponent of an 
 
 
 
 
70 Whitford, 151 F.Supp.3d at 918. 
71 Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral 
Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 239–69 (2013). 
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unopposed winner needs to be constructed.72 It is up to the political scientists to work 
this out with reasonably reliable statistical analyses. There will be multiple 
reasonable means of resolving these nuances, but the differences among them are 
unlikely to affect the ultimate conclusion that representational rights are indeed 
impaired by large efficiency gaps. 
 
VI. INDEPENDENTS AND MINORITY PARTIES 
 
Finally, plaintiffs have typically asserted claims asserting denial of rights to 
political parties or their supporters, and alleged that the effect of a gerrymander is 
statewide. Viewed as a denial of the ability to reach majority of a chamber in the state 
legislature, it seems correct that all supporters of the excluded party are wrongly 
denied representation of their views, and the effect is statewide. 
A qualitatively different complaint is available to Independents and third- 
party supporters. In a competitive district, they can choose between the two major 
party candidates, and often affect the outcome. In a gerrymandered map, however, 
up to ninety percent of the districts are virtually certain to elect the prevailing 
candidate in the party dominating that district.73 As a result, at least in states with 
closed primaries, Independents are effectively disenfranchised, having no say in 
whom the parties nominate, and being handed the winner of the district majority. As 
a result, in some districts Republicans and Independents are shut out, and in others 
Democrats and Independents are excluded from a meaningful vote. Some of this 
phenomenon occurs in any districting plan, but it is not unconstitutional because it 
is not the product of “illegitimate” districting considerations. The Supreme Court has 
assumed, without deciding, that partisan districting is “illegitimate” for purposes 
justifying population deviations. If so, it seems equally illegitimate in drawing district 
lines. Such an approach would create different, district-specific claims by different 
groups of people in different parts of the state. 
In this connection, the recent decision of the Seventh Circuit in Common Cause 
Indiana v. Individual Members of the Indiana Election Commission74 is interesting. 
The court unanimously affirmed the Chief Judge of the Southern District in holding 
unconstitutional Marion County Indiana’s system for electing its thirty-six Superior 
 
 
72 It would seem that a hypothetical vote for the minority party that did not field a candidate could be 
reasonably constructed by first determining the ratio of the total votes for the minority’s least well known 
statewide candidate (examples are auditor, treasurer, secretary of state) in all legislative districts which 
were contested between the two parties to the total votes for that party’s legislative candidates in those 
districts, then attributing that percentage of the statewide candidate’s vote in the legislative district to 
create a hypothetical anonymous minority candidate vote. This would require precinct level data on the 
statewide candidate’s race to construct his/her hypothetical district vote. If that is not available, it may 
be necessary to use presidential races adjusted for relative volume between them and state legislative 
races. I understand statisticians may favor more sophisticated techniques, and leave that issue for the 
courts to resolve. 
73 In 2014, thirty-seven of the one hundred Indiana House seats were unopposed. The prevailing candidate 
in ninety-four of hundred districts received more than fifty-five percent of the votes cast for a major party 
candidate. Election Results, INDIANA ELECTION DIVISION, 
http://www.in.gov/apps/sos/election/general/general2014?page=office&countyID=- 
1&officeID=10&districtID=-1&candidate= (last updated March 11, 2015, 10:01 AM). 
74 800 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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Court judges.75 The system was instituted in 1975 to assure partisan balance of the 
trial bench in Indianapolis and only slightly tweaked since.76 Its most recent 
incarnation called for each of the two major parties to nominate only half of the 
number of judges whose seats were up for election in any year. Absent a write-in or 
third party candidate, all primary winners were assured election in the general 
election. In the forty years of this plan, only an occasional write-in or third party 
candidate popped up, and none came anywhere near success. 
The Seventh Circuit grounded its decision expressly in a violation of First 
Amendment representational rights, holding that restricting the parties to 
nominating only half the seats burdened the voting rights of the party adherents, and 
also finding troublesome the disparity between the voting rights conferred on primary 
voters and others.77 The scheme invalidated in Common Cause was a de jure denial 
of voting rights to some, while a gerrymander can accomplish the same thing de facto. 
It remains to be seen whether this approach will supplement or even displace the 
conventional attack on gerrymanders as deprivations of minority party rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Id. at 928. 
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